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COMMENTS
ship which he does not advance, it is forever lost to him. The
French permit him to defend on one claim of title in the first
suit, and should he lose, he may sue on whatever other claims he
many have.
c) One who attacks the validity of a written instrument is
required by the common law to advance all his grounds of in-
validity in one suit;85 in France, this view has been adopted by
only two obscure commentators, one of whom subsequently
abandoned it.86 The modern view in France permits a separate
suit or defense on each vice, and even the view which formerly
prevailed was much more liberal than the common law.
CLAUDE O'QUIN
[This Comment will be concluded in a forthcoming issue of
the LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW, with a discussion of the Louisiana
jurisprudence.]
REMISSION IN THE CIVIL LAW
LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE OF 1870:
ART. 2100. The creditor, who consents to the division of
the debt with regard to one of the codebtors, still has an ac-
tion in solido against the others, but under the deduction of
the part of the debtor whom he has discharged from the debt
in solido.
ART. 2101. The creditor, who receives separately the part
of one of the debtors, without reserving in the receipt the debt
in solido or his right in general, renounces the debt in solido,
only with regard to that debtor.
The creditor is not deemed to remit the debt in solido to
the debtor when he receives from him a sum equal to the
portion due by him, unless the receipt specifies that it is for
his part.
The same is to be observed of the mere demand made of
one of the codebtors, for his part, if the latter has not ac-
quiesced in the demand or if a judgment has not been given
against him.
ART. 2203. The remission or conventional discharge in
favor of one of the codebtors in solido, discharges all the
85. It is not clear whether this is on the basis of res judicata as a bar,
or estoppel by judgment; see supra, note 33.
86. See note 53, supra.
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others, unless the creditor has expressly reserved his right
against the latter.
In the latter case, he can not claim the debt without
making a deduction of the part of him to whom he has made
the remission.'
In answer to a suggestion that these articles are in conflict,
the Louisiana Supreme Court said in Fridge v. Caruthers:2
"If there be such conflict, then it clearly behooves us to
choose which of the two articles we should follow; and, having
once so chosen, consistency would then require us to adhere
to that choice ...
"... Our predecessors have uniformly chosen to follow
article 2203, and not article 2100."
Chief Justice O'Niell concurred, but found no conflict between
the articles, although he assigned no reasons for his conclusion.
The following hypotheses may serve to illustrate the prob-
lem: A, B, and C are indebted in solido to D, who
(1) Divides the debt in favor of A, or receives the latter's
share and gives him a receipt "for his part";(2) Discharges the debt, giving notification thereof only
to A;
(3) Grants to A a "full and complete discharge from all
liability," either gratuitously or upon receipt of a payment from
him, without expressly reserving his right against the other co-
debtors.
In order properly to consider these hypotheses, it is neces-
sary to understand the three concepts into which remissions to
solidary obligors may be divided: remission of the solidarity, re-
mission of the debt, and remission of a part to the benefit of only
one of the codebtorsA
1. Arts. 2100, 2101, 2203, La. Civil Code of 1870, are literal translations of
Arts. 1210, 1211, 1285, respectively, of the French Civil Code. Compare Arts.
2096, 2097, 2199, La. Civil Code of 1825, in which the French version is the
same as the articles of the French Civil Code. The English version remains
unchanged in the Code of 1870.
2. 156 La. 746, 752, 101 So. 128, 131 (1924).
3. 5 Demante, Cours Analytique de Code Civil (2 ed. 1883) 231, no 144 bis.
I, states: "On peut comprendre trois sortes de remises, ou de renonclations
gratuites de crdancer d'une dette solidaire d ses droits. lo Remise de la dette
entiere; So remise de la part au profit de Pun des coddbiteurs; So remise de
la solidaritd."
(Translation) "There are understood three kinds of remissions, or grat-
uitous renunciations of his rights by the creditor of a solidary debt. (1) Re-
mission of the entire debt; (2) remission of part to the benefit of one of the
codebtors; (3) remission of the solidarity."
Cf. 2 Pothier, Oeuvres (2 ed. 1861) 129, Trait6 des Obligations, no 275.
[Vol. II
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REMISSION OF THE SOLIDARITY4
Since solidarity among debtors is established in favor of the
creditor, the latter may relinquish it by consenting to a division
of the debt.5 If such consent is given to all of the debtors the
solidarity is destroyed and each remains liable only for his part of
the debt.6 If there are more than two solidary debtors and the
creditor consents to a division of the debt in favor of only one
of them, the solidarity is destroyed as to him alone, the others
remaining liable each for the whole of the remainder.7 Inasmuch
as a division of the debt, which the French writers generally call
"remission of the solidarity," is granted in favor of the individual
or individuals concerned, Pothier has described it as a form of
personal remission.8
The creditor's consent to the division of the debt in favor of
one of the codebtors may be conferred either expressly or
tacitly." Such consent may result tacitly if the creditor, on re-
ceiving payment by one debtor of his share, gives a receipt
4. "Debt in solido" is the English translation given to the word "solid-
aritd" in the French version of Articles 2096 and 2097 of the La. Civil Code
of 1825. "Solidarity" seems to express the concept more accurately, since it
obviates confusion of "remission of the debt in solido" (solidarity) with
"remission of the debt."
For a discussion of "remission of the debt," see infra, pp. 368-369.
5. 2 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 3, at 131, no 277.
6. The effect of this division of the debt is to change the obligation from
solidary to joint. 2 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 3, at 327, no 617; 5 Demante,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 231, no 144 bis. I; 2 Planiol, Trait6 El~mentaire de
Droit Civil (11 ed. 1937) 270, no 773. 17 Laurent, Principes de Droit Civil
Frangais (2 ed. 1876) 346-347, nos 344-346, classifies renunciations of solidarity
into two classes, absolute and relative; it is absolute when it is granted to
all, a case seldom, if ever, occurring so that it is not even provided for in
the law; It is relative when granted to only one, or less than all, a case
covered by Articles 1210 and 1211 of the French Civil Code.
7. Baldwin v. Gray, 4 Mart. (N.S.) 192 (La. 1826); Benton v. Roberts, 1 Rob.
101 (La. 1841). These cases were decided in accordance with Articles 2096
and 2097 of the La. Civil Code of 1825 (now Articles 2100 and 2101), although
the articles were not cited therein.
8. Pothier defines real remission as a case where the creditor declares
the debt to be extinguished, as if he had received payment, although he has
not. Personal remission is the one by which the creditor simply discharges
the debtor of his obligation. Thus, according to Pothier, the remission of the
debt to one frees all the solidary debtors, whereas, the remission which dis-
charges only one debtor of his obligation is personal as to him and may not
be invoked by any of the others; the personal remission being applicable
to remission of the solidarity as well as to remission of the debtor's obliga-
tion. He depended upon the intention of the creditor to determine whether
the remission was personal or real. 2 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 3, at 327,
nos 616, 617.
Compare this latter theory of Pothier with Article 2203, La. Civil Code
of 1870.
9. 17 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 6, at 347, 350, nos 345, 348. Article 2100
governs express remission and Article 2101 is applicable to tacit remission.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. II
stating that it is "for his part";' but the mere acceptance by the
creditor of one debtor's share without such a statement in the
receipt would not be sufficient to release him from solidary
liability."'
The effect of a division of the debt, whether express or tacit,
in favor of one solidary codebtor is to discharge him alone from
the solidarity. The others remain liable in solido but only for
the remainder after deducting the share of the debtor who has
been released from the solidarity. This is the kind of remission
spoken of in Articles 2100 and 2101.
Since consent to the division of the debt in favor of one of
one of the solidary debtors operates to release only him from the
solidarity, a consequence of such a remission is that, if thereafter
one of the others becomes insolvent, the debtor granted the
benefit of division must yet bear his share of the portion due by
the insolvent. 2
REMISSION OF THE DEBT
Instead of merely consenting to a division of the debt in
solido (or remission of the solidarity), a creditor may dispossess
himself of it entirely. 18 This he may do in return for something
promised or received, or purely gratuitously. 4 Since there cannot
be a debtor without a debt, a release or extinguishment of the
10. "Payment in full of Mr. Gray's separate account" in a receipt was
held to release Gray from the solidarity. Baldwin v. Gray, 4 Mart. (N.S.)
192 (La. 1826).
Compare 2 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 3, at 131, no 277, where he says
that "without prejudice to the solidarity" does not apply to the other debtors,
but is a reservation of the solidarity against the one paying and overcomes
the presumption of tacit remission.
11. Article 2101, La. Civil Code of 1870. 5 Demante, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 248, no 154 bis. I; 17 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 6, at 350, no 348; 4 Marcad6,
Explication Th~orique et Pratique du Code Civil (7 ed. 1873) 509, Bk. III,
tit. III, no 621.
12. Article 2105, La. Civil Code of 1870. An understanding of this is im-
portant in the situation where the debtor has paid his part, because if he
were no longer liable for his share in the support of the insolvent's part,
he would be in the same situation as one who had been granted a remission
of a part to his benefit. For a discussion of this latter type of remission, see
infra, p. 369 et seq.
13. 17 Laurent, op. cit. supra note 6, at 347-348, no 346: "Quand le cruan-
cier fait remise de la dette 4 1'an des ddbiteurs soidaires, cette remise a
effet d N'dgard des autres, tous sont 1ibr8. Quand il fait remise de la soZid-
aritd d Fun d'eux, cette remise n'a pas d'effet d l'dgard des autres, is restent
tenus solidairement."
(Translation) "When the creditor remits the debt to one of the solidary
debtors, this remission has effect with regard to the others; all are liber-
ated. When he remits the solidarity to one of them, this remission has no
effect with regard to the others; they remain solidarily liable."
14. The gratuitous discharge is called by the French a remission of the
debt.
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debt discharges the debtors." This is of course true also of solid-
ary obligations. In this case a relinquishment of the debt may
occur in a transaction between the creditor and all of the solid-
ary debtors, or when the creditor is dealing with only one of
them, the result in either event being a discharge of all. Because
this is a remission of the thing which is the object of the relations
between the parties, Pothier called it a real remission.1
6
So far no difficulty has appeared. The first hypothesis given
at the beginning of this comment clearly falls within the intend-
ment of Articles 2100 and 2101;17 the second hypothesis results
in a discharge of all of the codebtors, since there may not be a
debtor after the extinguishment of the debt. Difficulty is en-
countered, however, in dealing with the third hypothesis, which
is a stage intermediate between the two remissions already dis-
cussed.
REMISSION OF A PART TO THE BENEFIT OF ONE CODEBTOR
Instead of consenting to a division of the debt in favor of
one of the solidary debtors, or of relinquishing the debt itself,
the creditor may desire to discharge completely one of the
debtors without affecting the debt or the others. 8 According to
Pothier, when one codebtor in solido is granted a complete dis-
charge and the creditor intends to maintain the solidary debt as
to the others, a personal remission 9 or discharge is effected and
the other codebtors remain liable.20 Thus the intention of the
creditor would be the sole criterion;2' the inquiry would be
directed at determining whether the creditor intended to grant
a discharge personal to the favored debtor, or to make a real
remission of the debt.
Article 2203 of the Louisiana Civil Code, however, provides
that a remission "in favor of one of the codebtors in solido,
22
15. 2 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 3, at 128, no 274.
16. See note 8, supra.
17. See note 9, supra.
18. As when A, B, and C are solidarily indebted to D for the sum of
$15,000, and D wishes to remit A's share, I.e., $5,000, but to maintain his
right against the other two.
19. Compare note 8, supra.
20. They remain liable only for the remainder after deduction is made
of A's part. 5 Demante, op. cit. supra note 3, at 231, no 144 bis. I; 2 Pothier,
op. cit. supra note 3, at 129, 327, nos 275, 617.
21. 2 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 3, IIe partie, c. III, art. III, no 585.
22. It is submitted that Article 2203 has no application to a remission
of the debt (see supra, pp. 368-369), since that would be in favor of all the co-
debtors, even though notification be given to only one of them; but the result
would be the same as to the other codebtors, in the absence of an express
reservation of right.
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discharges all the others,2" unless the creditor has expressly re-
served his right against the latter." In other words, it is con-
clusively presumed that the creditor intended to discharge all,24
unless he has contravened such assumption by a specific reser-
vation 5 of right against the other codebtors. This presumption
was probably incorporated in the Code2 6 in order to avoid the
difficulties of determining intention encountered under Pothier's
theory.
Therefore, following Article 2203 the result under the third
hypothesis2 7 would be the same as when the creditor has dis-
charged the entire debt; all of the codebtors would be released.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Adverting to the case of Fridge v. Caruthers21 and the sug-
gestion of conflict between Articles 2100 and 2203, the position
of the Chief Justice that these articles are not in conflict seems
entirely sound. Although under Article 2203 a personal discharge
granted to one solidary debtor will operate to release the other
debtors in the absence of an express reservation, yet when the
creditor merely consents to a division of the debt in favor of the
one, a reservation is unnecessary to maintain the creditor's right
against the other debtors. Of course, to find Article 2101 applic-
23. Where a tort action was brought against two defendants, and was
dismissed as to one of them because he was not at fault, it has been held
that since the discharged defendant was not plaintiff's debtor, the remain-
ing defendant was not released under Article 2203. Vredenburg v. Behan,
33 La. Ann. 627 (1881); Hall v. Allen Mfg. Co., 133 La. 1079, 63 So. 591 (1913);
Martin v. Sterkx, 146 La. 489, 83 So. 776 (1920).
24. Under Article 2203 of the La. Civil Code of 1870 all complete dis-
charges, whether of the debt or of the individual, are presumed to be real,
unless there was an express reservation or the receipt was made in strict
accordance with Article 2101.
On referring to Article 1285 of the French Civil Code, 18 Laurent, op.
cit. supra note 6, at 395, no 369, states: "Ainsi la remise est r~elle en prin-
cpe, elle n'est personnelle qu'en vertu d'une reserve expresse."
(Translation) "Thus remission is real in principle, It is personal only by
virtue of an express reservation." (Italics supplied.)
25. Although the reservation required by Article 2203 must be express,
there is nothing sacramental about the form by which a creditor reserves
his rights, it being sufficient that his intention to do so is made clear. Cusi-
mano v. Ferrara, 170 La. 1044, 129 So. 630 (1930) (release was granted "with
full and complete reservation of all my rights against all other judgment
debtors in said suit"); Landry v. New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 177 La.
105, 147 So. 698 (1933); Williams v. De Soto Bank & Trust Co., 189 La. 245,
179 So. 303 (1938) (release with a reservation of "their claims of indebted-
ness, suit, and causes of action against the remaining defendants").
26. The requirement of a reservation of right in order to preserve the
liability of the remaining codebtors after a discharge granted in favor of
one, was first introduced into the French law by the Code Napoleon (1804).
27. Supra, p. 366.
28. See note 2, supra.
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able it is necessary to discover an intention on the part of the
creditor merely to divide the debt, not to discharge the favored
debtor. The distinction is important practically because, as seen
above,29 if a solidary creditor consents to a division of the debt
in favor of one debtor and thereafter one of the others becomes
insolvent, the one in whose favor the debt has been divided must
bear his proportion of the share of the insolvent.80 Granting a
full discharge to him, instead of merely dividing the debt in his
favor, would prevent any subsequent recovery against him, 1 re-
gardless of the ability of the others to satisfy the obligation.
Therefore, on the question of permitting further recovery against
a solidary debtor who has paid his part to the creditor, a finding
of whether the creditor has consented only to a division of the
debt in his favor or has completely discharged him from the debt
would be determinative.
The solution of the third situation under Article 2203 results
inequitably when the creditor desires to hold the other codebtors,
but fails through ignorance of a technical rule to make the reser-
vation required. The necessity of such a stipulation would not be
likely to occur to the average layman; so any complete discharge
of one solidary debtor granted without legal advice would prob-
ably result in a release of the other codebtors from their just
obligation through an artificial presumption of the law. This has
been obvious in many of the cases decided under Article 2203
by the courts of Louisiana.2
29. Supra, p. 368.
30. See note 12, supra.
31. In this event the creditor must suffer the loss, and if a reservation
of right had been made, the other codebtors would be liable only for their
shares plus their pro rata portion of the insolvent's. 14 Baudry-Lacantinerie
et Barde, Trait6 Th~orique et Pratique de Droit Civil (3 ed. 1908), Des
Obligations III, 118, no 1791; 8 Huc, Commentaire Th~orique et Pratique du
Code Civil (1892-1903) Bk. III, tit. III, c. V, no 138; 2 Pothier, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 134, no 278.
32. Harrison v. Poole, 8 Rob. 202 (La. 1884); Orr & Lindsley v. Hamilton,
36 La. Ann. 790 (1884) (holding that any amount paid by one debtor on the
score of damages in discharge of an obligation arising from their tortious
acts, must discharge all of the debtors, in the absence of the reservation);
Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Bridger, 133 La. 754, 63 So. 319 (1913); Fridge
v. Caruthers, 156 La. 746, 101 So. 128 (1924) (acceptance from one of four
debtors in solido, of one-fourth of the total debt "in full settlement of his
obligation" was held to release all the debtors); George J. Bishop, Inc. v.
Jones, 17 La. App. 410 (1931) (a release granted to one debtor upon part
payment, not stipulating for his part held to release codebtor); Recile v.
Southern United Ice Co., 17 La. App. 611 (1931); Sly v. New Orleans, T. & M.
Ry. Co., 142 So. 276 (La. App. 1932); Reid v. Lowden, 192 La. 811, 189 So. 286
(1939) (where a "full and final release in compromise settlement" was granted
to one tortfeasor, co-tortfeasor held to be released also); Crowell & Spencer
Lbr. Co. v. Lacaze, 188 So. 446 (La. App. 1939) (liquidation of a solidary debt
by one debtor, who made part payment and agreed to make subsequent in-
stallments, discharged the other debtor).
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In Harrison v. Poole,13 for example, one cosigner of a promis-
sory note was discharged in order to make his testimony avail-
able against the other in a suit on the note. There being no
express reservation of right against the other codebtor in solido,
it was held that he was thereby released. Since suit had already
been filed, it is obvious that the creditor did not intend to dis-
charge both; but no other result could be attained under the clear
intendment of Article 2199 of the Code of 1825 (now Article
2203).
Baudry-Lacantinerie has criticized3 4 the redactors of the
French Civil Code for deviating from Pothier's theory of com-
plete reliance on the intention of the creditor, 5 and there seems
much merit in his position. If this presumption was incorporated
in Article 2203 only to avoid difficulty in determining intention,
the redactors were needlessly cautious. The subjective intention
of the creditor need not be found; his objective intention, as
manifested by the situation of the parties or by the creditor's
words or actions, would supply an adequate and reasonably
accurate test. In the absence of any such manifestation, the usual
rule would be applied, that no one is ever presumed to have re-
linquished a right,3 6 so that other codebtors could not sustain
their burden of proving the discharge. Since the creditor who
intends to discharge all of the solidary debtors almost invariably
makes such intention clear, this solution would rarely work
hardship; and the inequities which have abounded under the
present law would be obviated.
MILTON M. HARRISON
33. 8 Rob. 202 (La. 1884). The remission was made here because a party
in interest could not testify.
34. 14 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde, op. cit. supra note 31, at 118, no
1791. Cf. 26 Demolombe, Cours de Code Napoleon (1875) Bk. III, tit. III, c.
IV, no 396. But see 5 Larombi~re, Th~orie et Pratique des Obligations
(nouvelle ed. 1885) art. 1285, no 13.
35. See note 21, supra.
36. 5 Demante, op. cit. supra note 3, at 232, no 144 bis. II; 17 Laurent, op.
cit. supra note 6, at 347, no 346; 4 Marcad6, op. cit. supra note 11, Bk. III,
tit. III, no 621; 2 Pothier, op. cit. supra note 3, at 131, no 277. Micaud v. John-
son, Man. Unrep. Cas. 327 (La. 1880); Landry v. New Orleans Public Service,
177 La. 105, 147 So. 698 (1933); Williams v. De Soto Bank & Trust Co., 189
La. 245, 179 So. 303 (1938).
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